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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JAMES REDD and JEANNE REDD, 
Defendant/Appellees 
Case No. 20000556-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State has instituted its third appeal in this matter, 
seeking to overturn the Trial Court's dismissal of the felony 
charges, and to overturn the Court of Appeal's decision in State 
v. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) . 
This matter is before this Court pursuant to a certification by the 
Court of Appeals under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 
43(a) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the District Court correct in its dismissal of the refiled 
felony counts, based upon State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986) and State v. Morgan, 997 P.2d 910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1989 
(Utah 2000)? 
The standard of review is one of correctness and clearly 
erroneous. For statutory interpretation, the correctness standard 
applies; State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993); however, 
findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26(7) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann 76-9-704 (1996) is at the core of the felony 
charges; however, this appeal involves the clearly erroneous 
standard of factual findings and case law interpretation of 
Brickey, supra, and Morgan, supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Over four years ago, the defendants were charged with a felony 
arising from an incident on January 6, 1996. The lower Court has 
dismissed all or part of the charges three times. The government 
first appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, lost, sought 
rehearing, lost, refiled more charges, lost half of those, appealed 
to the Court of Appeals, who certified the case because the instant 
issue was obviously destined for this Supreme Court. The 
government fought the certification and, ultimately, the matter 
was remanded to the lower Court who dismissed charges a third time. 
The government appealed a third time, this time reversing its 
previous position and seeking certification. The appellees did not 
resist certification. 
The third dismissal was premised upon the only decision in 
this State defining "good cause," State v. Morgan, supra. Therein 
the clear, simple ruling is that "Evidence or witnesses previously 
known, available and unpresented by the prosecutor without 
2 
justification do not constitute good cause." Morgan, supra, p. 
912. The instant case has precisely that fact pattern such that 
unless Morgan is overturned, this is a frivolous appeal. 
The government, despite three dismissals, three appeals, four 
years of litigation, and the clear controlling ruling of Morgan, 
as well as State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), argues there 
has been no prosecutorial abuse and Mr. and Mrs. Redd's right to 
due process is not implicated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The government sets forth some of the testimony elicited at 
the two Preliminary Hearings. The key focus is their argument 
regarding the initially omitted but available testimony that 
"Ethnographic sources [say]: 
that very often burials take place in that 
midden area, because, first of all, it's 
easy to dig and especially with punitive 
tools ... areas that are soft and easy to 
dig are very often the places - of repose 
for - humans. The second part being that 
very often deaths, of course, take place 
in the winter time when lots of the 
available ground is frozen and even harder 
to dig, so those soft areas in the midden 
are very much utilized as burials. Citing 
"Case #2; Tr. 164; 9, 10". 
Omitted by the State in their recitation of facts are the 
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following questions by counsel for the defendants and answers by 
their expert: 
Q. But, there was nothing here of a 
grave good nature, is that correct? 
A. No, not that I saw. 
Q. Okay# now, as I understand it, you 
concluded this was a grave because the 
bones were nearby, period? 
A. That and the very frequent association 
of burials, of graves in the midden area. 
Q. Okay. But that is a generic statement 
for the Southwest; is that correct? 
A. That would be correct; yes. 
Q. Has nothing to do with this particular 
spot because there's no grave goods in 
order for you to tell what went on there? 
A. Except to say it is in the Southwest, 
yeah. 
skipping a few lines-
Q. Do you even know if this is one versus 
five individuals with either a toe, a 
finger, an arm, that sort of thing? 
A. No, we haven't analyzed the human 
remains to that extent 
Case #2; Tr. pages 16-17. (emphasis of 
underlining added) 
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This Court, in State v. Redd, 992 P.2d 986, 991 (1999), 
appropriately addressed "the broader public policy our 
interpretation advances" and, through footnotes, referenced to 
articles from the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News, regarding 
older burial sites. Factually, in the instant case, the transcript 
of the government's expert points distinctly away from a burial 
site and by admission the generalities have no connection to the 
instant case other than the fact the situs is in the Southwestern 
United States. The Salt Lake Tribune, December 10, 1998 "Cannibals 
of the Corners"; Ogden Standard-Examiner, September 7, 2000, "Tests 
show cannibalism among ancient Anasazi Indians"; The Denver Post, 
September 7, 2000, "Indian Cannibal Evidence Surfaces"; and Denver 
Rocky Mountain News, September 7, 2 000, Associated Press, finds 
"Cannibalism Evidence At Anasazi Site"; all show, factually, an 
equal if not greater explanation as to what occurred in the instant 
case. There simply is a void of evidence supporting a burial and 
a plethora of alternative explanations, including cannibalism. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The government and defendants agree that the focus of this 
appeal is the viability of the refiled felony charges in the 
instant case. 
Clearly the government had the power, as set forth in the 
footnote of the Court of Appeals decision denying rehearing, to 
refile the charges. The question is whether the holdings of State 
v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986) and State v. Morgan, 997 P.2d 
910, cert, granted, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000), combine to mandate the 
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dismissal of the newly filed charges. 
The government concedes, at page 13 of their opening brief, 
that "... the instant case does not involve new or previously 
unavailable evidence ...? 
The government argues that "Specifically, where the State 
innocently miscalculated the amount of evidence necessary for a 
bindover, and where a changed circumstance - the articulation of 
new law by an appellate court - arose directly from the dismissal, 
and where defendants1 due process rights are not implicated, 
neither the Brickev rule nor the due process rationale underlying 
it present a bar to refiling." 
The defendants respond that there is no bar to refiling, but 
rather a bar to proceeding in lieu of "other good cause" and that 
"other good cause" does not include "evidence or witnesses 
previously known, available and unpresented by the prosecutor 
without justification." Morgan, supra, p. 912. 
The government rests its argument as to good cause to refile, 
on page 16 of their brief, upon an excerpt of a footnote in 
Brickey, which refers to Harper v. Dist. Ct., 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. 
1971). The language quoted by the State, which is the water upon 
which the government's theory floats, is "when a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to obtain 
a bindover." However, materially and painfully harmful for the 
government's position, is the missing preceding language in the 
partially quoted footnote - "holding that good cause to continue 
a preliminary hearing for further investigation might exist ...." 
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(emphasis added) There is more. Contrary to the quote on page 
16 of the government's brief, their vaunted quote not only has a 
beginning which sets it apart from this case, it also has an end 
which qualifies it as being different from this case. That ending 
language, after the word "bindover" is ... and further 
investigation clearly would not be dilatory." (emphasis added) 
The operative language of Harper, supra, 895, is that to allow the 
prosecutor unbridled discretion to refile dismissed charges "tends 
to make a mockery of the meaning of 'due process of law' and 
appears to place the District Attorney in a dictatorial position, 
in relation to the judiciary." 
The government also urges that "the articulation of new law 
by an appellate court" is a "changed circumstance" which permits 
a sustaining of a refiling. However, the statutory interpretation 
in State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), is not new law 
but a straight forward interpretation of an old law. The Court of 
Appeals went to great length in discussing statutory construction, 
citing Deland v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 1995); State v. 
Scieszka, 897 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and others in 
reaching its conclusion that the State must prove three elements -
elements being defined in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary, p. 734 as, among others, "one of the constitutional 
parts, principles, materials or traits of anything: one of the 
relatively simple forms or units that enter variously into a 
complex substance." Identification and enunciation of simple 
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elements cannot be labelled "articulation of new law#" and there 
is neither statutory nor case law support for that premise. 
Finally, the State argues that State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 
(Utah App. 1998) "represents a better model from which to seek 
guidance." Fisk is a case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It 
is also one that speaks to "new evidence" and specifically sets 
forth ... "we do not address defendants' arguments that the 'other 
good cause' prong of the Brickev test was not satisfied ..." Fisk, 
supra, p. 863. (emphasis added) The Fisk case shows evidence that 
the government developed their new evidence after a separate 
hearing in a separate forum. In the instant case, the record is 
void of any evidence as to why the government should be able to put 
the defendants through three dismissals and three appeals. 
The key is Brickey language - "unless the prosecutor can show 
other good cause." Brickey, supra, p. 647. In the instant 
case, the prosecutor has tendered nothing while the Attorney 
General's Office seeks to shift the burden to the defense. It is 
not the burden of the defense to prove a negative. It is the 
burden of the prosecutor to prove "other good cause." 
Brickey prohibits a continuation of these charges. Morgan 
prohibits a continuation of these charges. Due process and common 
sense prohibit a continuation of these charges. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT 
IN ITS THIRD DISMISSAL OF FELONY CHARGES 
Addendum F of the government's brief contains a reproduction 
of the Order by the Trial Court sought by the appellant to be 
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overturned. 
That Order contains the following factual finding by the Trial 
Court/ labelling as "accurate observation" the magistrate's 
findings: 
Brickey does suggest that a prosecutor's 
initial miscalculation of the quantum of 
evidence might justify refiling. Here, 
however, it is not the quantum of evidence 
that was miscalculated, but the nature of 
the evidence. The State did not fail to 
present enough evidence on March 20, 1997, 
to prove a dead body had been buried; it 
presented none, (emphasis added) (Addendum 
F, p. 2) 
The Court then went on to hold, legally: 
Lack of new evidence and innocent 
miscalculation as to the evidence required 
to obtain a bindover are the two areas 
that Brickey and Morgan together set forth 
as insufficient grounds to permit a 
refiling of charges after dismissal. It 
is those very claims that the State sets 
forth in this case. While the practical 
application of these cases may be unduly 
restrictive on the prosecution, in light 
of Brickey and Morgan> this Court is 
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compelled to grant the defendants1 motion. 
State v. Brickey, supra, was a case of first impression in 
Utah: what are the limits on the state's ability to refile criminal 
charges when those charges have been previously dismissed for 
insufficient evidence? The Utah Supreme Court found that the State 
is not free to refile criminal charges under all circumstances. 
"For if this were the case, the State could easily harass 
defendants by refiling criminal charges which had previously been 
dismissed for insufficient evidence. Consideration of fundamental 
fairness preclude vesting the State with such unbridled 
discretion." Brickey, supra, p. 647. 
Thus, implicitly, continuing to pursue refiled criminal 
charges which have been previously dismissed for insufficient 
evidence is harassment unless there is an exception to the rule. 
In* the instant case, the factual finding, viewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard is that the State produced no evidence to prove 
a basic element. Thus, the factual rule in this case is that the 
State failed to go forward both as to a key element and failed to 
offer any explanation or "other good cause." 
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to "find merit in the 
approach taken by the Oklahoma courts." Brickey, supra, 647. The 
case followed by Utah is Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1971) . In Jones, the prosecutor must show that new or 
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good 
cause justifies refiling. The burden is on the prosecutor. In the 
instant case, contrary to State v. Fisk, 966 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 
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1998) , the prosecutor has not introduced a scintilla of evidence 
of his good faith, leaving open all options, including the 
possibility that this refiling is politically driven by the 
government, not the prosecutor, by the huge amount of press and not 
by the principles of due process. At the lowest base fact, there 
is a void of effort by the prosecutor to produce evidence of "other 
good cause," contrary to the mandate of Jones, supra, and this 
Supreme Court in Brickey, as well as demonstrated in Fisk, supra. 
In Brickey, which adopts the Jones rationale, the reviewing 
magistrate or Court must look "at the facts to determine whether 
the new evidence (none claimed by the prosecutor here) or changed 
circumstances (none argued by the prosecutor) are sufficient to 
require a re-examination and possible reversal of the earlier 
decision dismissing the charges." Brickey, supra, 647. 
The appellant takes from context, a part of footnote 5 in 
Brickey. The case cited is Harper v. Dist. Ct.# 484 P.2d 891 
(1971), an Oklahoma case issued the same year, but after, Jones, 
supra. Harper involved a District Court interfering with a 
magistrate's decision as to a bindover of a preliminary hearing. 
Harper repeats the prohibition against another filing "unless the 
State makes an offer of additional evidence or proves other good 
cause to justify another preliminary examination." Harper, supra, 
897. (emphasis added) Again, "In short, for good cause shown ..." 
Harper, supra, 897. Equally importantly, the footnote in Brickey, 
quoted by the State, refers to a continuance of a preliminary 
hearing when the prosecutor miscalculates the quantum of evidence, 
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and further investigation would not be dilatory - not to the 
refiling good cause that must be shown by the prosecutor. 
State v. Morgan, supra, is a drug case, involving possession 
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. At the preliminary 
hearing, the prosecutor chose to only call one witness, despite the 
availability of the second witness. There was a failure to show 
one element, intent to distribute. Morgan also repeats the clear 
error standard as to factual findings, citing State v. Parra, 972 
P.2d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) for the mandatory presumption that 
the factual findings underlying the determination as to due process 
violation are correct. 
In Morgan, as well as Brickey, the prosecutor was prohibited 
from proceeding on the refiled charges. In Brickey, the prosecutor 
failed to introduce any evidence of an element of the forcible 
sexual assault. In the instant case, the factual finding is the 
same - the prosecutor failed to introduce any evidence of an 
element of the charge. In Morgan, the testimony of the second 
witness "contained no suggestion of new or previously unavailable 
evidence." Morgan, supra, p. 912. Such is uncontested in the 
instant case. 
Morgan repeats the mandate - there is a prohibition "unless 
the prosecutor can show that either (1) new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced, or (2) that other good cause 
exists to justify refiling." Morgan, supra, 912. (emphasis added) 
Clearly the burden is on the prosecutor. In the instant case, 
there was no attempt, no scintilla of evidence produced by the 
12 
prosecutor. 
The holding in Morgan, supra, 917, is "Other good cause, as 
described in Brickey, must at a minimum, be something beyond the 
introduction of a witness who was present in the courtroom, sworn, 
and ready to testify at the first preliminary hearing, whose 
testimony is known at the time and does not change in any material 
way after the initial bindover is dismissed." "Evidence or 
witnesses previously known, available and unpresented by the 
prosecutor without justification do not constitute good cause." 
Morgan, supra, p. 913. 
In the instant case, the government's expert, Dale Davidson, 
was called at the first hearing, which resulted in the dismissal 
and recalled at the second hearing "for some additional issues." 
Case #2, Tr., p. 5. Parenthetically, there was a stipulation that 
the vehicle of the looters seen at the scene earlier in the fall 
was not that of the defendants. Case #2, Tr., p. 6-7. Nowhere in 
the transcript of the second hearing does the prosecutor proffer 
even an excuse, much less a scintilla of evidence as is mandated 
by Jones, Harper, Brickey, Morgan, and demonstrated in Fisk, that 
the new Davidson testimony was somehow unavailable previously. 
The appellant argues, using an extraction of Fisk, that, on 
page 17, the Brickey rule "ensures that the defendant is not 
harassed by repeated charges on tenuous grounds." In the instant 
case, the testimony by the government witness is that "there was 
nothing here of a grave good nature, ... is that correct?" Answer, 
"No, not that I saw." Case #2, Tr. p. 16. His clear testimony is 
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that he only concluded this was a grave (a place of intentional 
interment) because of the bones nearby and the frequent association 
of burials, of graves in the midden area. But, this "is a generic 
statement for the Southwest, is that correct? That would be 
correct, yes." Case #2, Tr. p. 17. 
How more tenuous can the evidence be of interment than "a 
generic statement" of the entire Southwestern region of the United 
States? There are no grave goods - a void of evidence of a grave. 
More importantly, science now sees ample evidence of cannibalism 
among the Anasazi (as set forth in the Summary of Argument). The 
unalterable fact is that this was not a grave. 
The premise of Brickev is that it is harassing to refile 
criminal charges when they have been dismissed for insufficient 
evidence. ONLY when the prosecutor can show, can prove, "other 
good cause," can the harassment be overcome. With a void of effort 
in the transcript, there is nothing that argument can substitute, 
for argument is just that - argument. The evidence is in the 
transcript - or, in this case, the lack of evidence or effort. One 
has but to read Fisk, to see enormous distinctions with a 
difference in the position of the prosecutors in Fisk versus the 
instant case. 
The government poses the argument that at the first hearing, 
neither the Court nor the defense addressed the missing element. 
Thankfully our system is one of an adversarial nature. It is the 
prosecutor1s burden, light that it is, to put on some evidence of 
the basic elements. As the Trial Court observed and as quoted 
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already from appellant's Addendum F, p. 2, the State did not fail 
to present enough evidence on March 20/ 1997, to prove a dead body 
had been buried/ it presented none. (emphasis added) 
The State persists in arguing that unless there is forum-
shopping or purposeful obfuscation of evidence through sandbagging# 
there is no harassment. That is NOT the premise of Brickev and 
that is not the reality of two Utah citizens and their five 
children who have endured, economically and emotionally/ three 
government appeals and repeated filings. 
The State, using repeated metaphors of ships - "adrift/" 
"anchor/" "casts a net/" argues that Morgan undermines the 
essential guiding principle of the Brickev rule. The State seeks 
solace in its appellation of "Brickev1s suggestion" that an 
innocent miscalculation of the quantum of evidence necessary for 
a bindover may in and of itself suffice as "another subcategory" 
of "good cause." The simple fact is that this is a Court of law# 
not a Court of "suggestions." The simple fact is that the State 
ignores the mandate that the prosecutor must prove good cause - and 
such was not even argued at the hearing. Even their argument/ on 
page 25# is that "the State plainly had sufficient evidence for at 
least a bindover." (emphasis added) Hopefully the State is never 
the recipient of such an unrelenting assault. "at least a 
bindover?" Such statement epitomizes the refiling of a tenuous 
case! 
The ship of the State floats upon the premise that when the 
prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence 
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necessary for a bindover, they are able to attack again. This 
subjective argument is supported by nothing. In Fisk, the entire 
history of the case was presented. Not so here. The factual 
finding of no evidence stands. It is equally possible that the 
driving force for the refiling is NOT the prosecutor, for there is 
no record of why this all occurred. Fisk hurts the State by 
showing steps taken by the State as to new evidence versus the void 
in the instant case. Brickev and Morgan torpedo the ship of the 
State. 
CONCLUSION 
The facts as found by the Court, the law of Jones, Harper, 
Brickey, and Morgan, due process, and common sense, join together 
to overwhelm the void of effort of the prosecutor to show "other 
good cause." This is not an Empty Grave, it is NOT a grave. 
Generic statements are insufficient to subject Utah citizens to the 
rigors of trial on a case described by the State's best advocate 
as "at least a bindover." Failing to put on any evidence of a 
basic element is not "good cause." Morgan is good law. The facts 
here are undisputed. The Trial Court's dismissal should not be 
overturned! 
Respectfully submitted, 
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